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The rise of accounting scandals in the last decade has reduced trust of the 
users in audited financial statements, so users have started questioning 
the quality of audit work. This paper aims to test empirically whether 
audit-firm tenure reduces audit quality. After the accounting scandals in 
the USA and the Europe, and the associated failure of Arthur Andersen, 
benefits of audit firm or partner rotation on audit quality becomes a 
controversial subject. Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 considered audit firm 
tenure as a potential area that needed to be investigated because the 
consecutive years of auditor-client relationship has the potential to impair 
auditor independence. It is argued that the audit quality and therefore the 
quality of general purpose financial statements increase when a new 
auditor with fresh and skeptical eyes evaluates the financial statements. 
Using the same senior personnel on an audit engagement over a long 
period of time believed to create self-interest and familiarity threats to 
independence (Eilifsen, Messier, Glover and Prawit, 2010). For example, in 
the Enron case, it appears that the auditors became too familiar with the 
company personnel, such that independence in fact and in appearance 
both may have been compromised (Ryken et al, 2007). Familiarity lead to 
learned confidence about the results when making assumptions about 
outcomes and using less rigorous audit procedures or static audit 
programs.  
According to the new Independent Audit Communiqué issued in December 
2012 by Turkish Public Oversight Accounting and Auditing Standards Board 
(POAASB), in an audit of the public interest entity, a firm shall not be the 
auditor for more than seven years for the last ten years.  In addition to 
that, an individual shall not be a key audit partner for more than five years 
in the last seven years. After such time the individual shall not be a 
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member of the engagement team or be a key audit partner for the client 
for two years (Official Gazette, 25809).  
This paper tests whether a statistically significant association exists 
between the audit firm tenure with a client and evidence of reduced audit 
quality as measured by the propensity of modified audit opinions. We 
assume that the decline in audit quality is indicated by the auditor not 
issuing a modified opinion for firms whose financial statements are 
materially misstated. Based on a sample of 253 firms listed on İstanbul 
Stock Exchange (ISE) and 2277 firm-year observations of audit reports 
during the 2002-2010 periods, the analysis produces evidence that the 
number of consecutive years of audit firm-client relationship negatively 
affects the auditor quality measured by the propensity of modified audit 
opinions. We choose the 2008 and 2009 periods for our main analysis 
because in 2010 a mandatory audit firm rotation policy was executed for 
the companies listed in the ISE. Before this period Turkey has an 
environment where the rotation policy is not mandatory. The results of 
this study are expected to contribute the regulation of the quality of 
auditing by the regulator (POAASB) with regard to auditor rotation.  
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